In short, there is no existing law authorizing the president to declare martial law. However, Congress has given the president considerable authority to deploy troops inside the country to support civil law enforcement. The deployment of troops under the Insurrection Act may not raise the same concerns that would be associated with the imposition of martial law, but there is cause for concern when a president uses the military as a national police force – particularly without the consent of the state to which the armed forces are sent. Marcos wrote in his diary of September 22, 1972 (timestamp 9:55 p.m.): “Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile was ambushed near Wack-Wack tonight around 8:00 p.m. Fortunately, he drove in his safety car as a protective measure. This makes the imposition of martial law a necessity. » Sein Tagebucheintrag für den 25. September 1972 mentions the conditions after two days of martial law, which also indicates that martial law is actually dated September 23, 1972. The imposition of martial law is a rare and momentous decision for the civilian government, and for good reason.

When martial law is declared, civilian control of some or all aspects of government operations is transferred to the military. Although discussed in some legal discussions, martial law can also occur in stages without ever reaching complete control by the military. Under current U.S. law, the president, Congress or a local military commander can impose martial law in certain situations. We must turn to another Supreme Court case: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. footnote6_8r66gzi 6 Youngstown, 343 US 579. Youngstown ruled in 1952 that President Harry Truman could not seize U.S. steel mills to prevent a labor dispute from disrupting the nation`s wartime steel supply. The decision – and in particular the unanimous opinion of Justice Robert Jackson – has since become the doctrinal benchmark for judging any exercise of power by the executive.

footnote7_ij60uh0 7 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 pp. Ct. 1346, 1350 (2008) (“Justice Jackson`s familiar tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”); Ladies & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (“Jackson J. in his concurring opinion in Youngstown. brings together as many combinations of analysis and common sense as there are in this field. »); and H.

Jefferson Powell, The President as Commander in Chief: An Essay in Constitutional Vision (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2014), 53-135. Take, for example, when the president declares martial law on the U.S. border with Mexico, uses the military to enforce federal immigration laws, and establishes military tribunals to prosecute alleged violations. In this hypothetical scenario, a federal court would likely use Youngstown to decide whether the president has exceeded executive power. The debate and tensions over when to deploy federal or national guards for martial law are unlikely to end. Finally, the commander-in-chief clause would not allow the president to unilaterally impose martial law in defiance of the Posse Comitatus law and other laws governing the domestic use of the military. First, the commander-in-chief clause is not a source of national regulator for the president. footnote18_ewzncbh 18 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643–44 (Jackson, J., with agreement); and Powell, president as commander-in-chief, 120-21. As Justice Jackson explained to Youngstown, “the Constitution did not provide that the title of commander-in-chief of the army and navy” would also mean that the president was “commander-in-chief of the country, its industries, and its people.” footnote19_81jkrku 19 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 643–44 (Jackson, J., agree). Although the clause grants something more than an “empty title,” invoking it does not give the president carte blanche.

footnote20_a35tmcm 20 Youngstown, 343 U.S. to 641 (Jackson, J., with agreement). In internal affairs, both in general and with regard to the role of the military, the Constitution provides that Congress is the branch that takes control. footnote21_gniu0qo 21 Vladeck, “Calling Forth Clause and the Domestic Commander-in-Chief,” p. 1106. However, since the Civil War was certainly over, a court divided in the Milligan case,228 which reverted to the old doctrine, quashed President Lincoln`s trial after he suspended the habeas corpus mandate in September 1863 by calling for the trial of individuals imprisoned as “spies” and “instigators of the enemy.” Ordained by a military commission. The most important passage of the Court`s opinion on this point is as follows: “If, in the event of a foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are effectively closed and it is impossible to administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the law, then in the scene of active military operations, where war actually prevails, It is necessary to substitute civil authority. overthrown in such a way as to preserve the security of the military and society; And since there is no power but the army, it is permissible to rule in time of war until the laws can function freely. As necessity creates the rule, it limits its duration; Because if this government continues after the courts are restored, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial law can never exist when the courts are open and exercise their jurisdiction properly and without hindrance. It is also limited to the site of the actual war.

229 Four judges who spoke of Chief Justice Chase quashed Milligan`s trial on the grounds that it violated the law of March 3, 1863, which governed the custody and trial of persons deprived of the privilege of habeas corpus, and stated that they believed Congress could have approved Milligan`s trial. The Chief Justice wrote: “Congress has the power not only to raise, support, and govern armies, but also to declare war. It therefore has the power to provide by law for the continuation of war. This power necessarily extends to all laws essential to a vigorous and successful war, except those which interfere with the conduct of the armed forces and the conduct of the countryside.